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Abstract—Networked mobile devices have great potential to
enable individuals (and their physicians) to better monitor their
health and to manage medical conditions. In this paper, we
examine the privacy-related threats to these so-called mHealth
technologies. We develop a taxonomy of the privacy-related
threats, and discuss some of the technologies that could support
privacy-sensitive mHealth systems. We conclude with a brief
summary of research challenges.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Healthcare information technology has potential to improve
healthcare quality, improve efficiency, and reduce cost, and is
currently on the cusp of major innovations and widespread
deployment around the world. In this paper, we specifically
examine the privacy challenges involved in mobile computing
and communications technologies used for personal-health
monitoring. Such mHealth technology appears promising in
many ways: enabling physicians to remotely monitor their
patients’ health and improve the quality of healthcare, enabling
patients to manage their health more easily, and reducing the
cost of care by allowing patients to spend less time in the hospital or make fewer visits to their doctor. The UN Foundation
recently formed the mHealth Alliance specifically to explore
and promote the value of mobile computing technologies in
improving healthcare in developing nations [1].
In mHealth, Mobile Internet Devices (MIDs), connected
wirelessly to wearable, portable, and even embeddable sensors,
will enable long-term continuous medical monitoring for many
purposes: for outpatients with chronic medical conditions
(such as diabetes), individuals seeking to change behavior
(such as losing weight), physicians needing to quantify and
detect behavioral aberrations for early diagnosis (such as
depression), or athletes wishing to monitor their condition
and performance. (In this paper, we use the term “Patient” to
describe the subject of sensing in all such use cases, using the
capitalized form as a reminder of its broader meaning.) The
resulting data may be used directly by the Patient [2] or may
be shared with a physician for treatment [3], with an insurance
company for coverage, with a scientist for research [4], with
a coach for athletic training [5], or with family members
and friends in social-networking communities targeted towards
health and wellness [6]. These citations are only examples.
A. The Challenge
Although mHealth systems may indeed improve quality of
healthcare and to improve quality of life, they also generate
978-1-4244-8953-4/11/$26.00 c 2011 IEEE

new security and privacy issues [7]. In this paper, we focus
on privacy; it is therefore essential that we define it clearly
for the context of healthcare. Fortunately, others have thought
deeply about this issue; we adopt the definition selected
by the National Committee for Vital and Health Statistics
(NCVHS), a key advisory committee to the US Department of
Health and Human Services. “Health information privacy is an
individual’s right to control the acquisition, uses, or disclosures
of his or her identifiable health data. Confidentiality, which is
closely related, refers to the obligations of those who receive
information to respect the privacy interests of those to whom
the data relate. Security is altogether different. It refers to
physical, technological, or administrative safeguards or tools
used to protect identifiable health data from unwarranted
access or disclosure” [8]. We also follow NCVHS and define
PHI as “personal health information.”
Clearly, privacy is important in any healthcare information
system. What is different or especially challenging about
mHealth privacy? First, mHealth allows for the collection of
far more medical data about the Patient, as many mHealth
devices collect data continuously over extended periods of
time. Second, mHealth allows much broader range of healthrelated information to be collected, not just physiological data;
many mHealth applications will collect information about
Patient lifestyle and activities (such as food habits and diet
details, location tracks, physical activity, or social interactions). Third, mHealth will enable a broad range of healthrelated applications: sharing data with your health provider,
as in a traditional doctor relationship, but also sharing data
with an insurance company (e.g., to confirm compliance with
a medication regimen), with lifestyle coaches (e.g., diet advisers), with athletic coaches (e.g., sports teams or health-club
trainers), or with family (e.g., to support a relative’s recovery
from surgery). In such settings, privacy is a complex issue:
the Patient needs subtle control over the collection, recording,
dissemination, and access to their mHealth data. In an earlier
paper [9], we present a privacy framework for mHealth, built
on well-known healthcare privacy frameworks. In this paper,
we contribute a taxonomy of threats for mHealth privacy, and
survey some existing technical solutions to those challenges.
B. Background
In many cases, the data collected by mHealth devices will
be incorporated into a medical record. There are at least two

broad categories of medical records. An Electronic Health
Record (EHR) is created and managed by a healthcare provider
(hospitals and other clinical organizations), whereas a Personal
Health Record (PHR) is created and managed by the Patient
herself. Since PHRs pose at least as many privacy challenges
as EHRs, we focus primarily on PHRs in this paper.
In the patient-centric PHR model, typified by Google
Health [10] and Microsoft’s HealthVault [11], Patients control
all their PHI via web portals, including operations to create,
import, update, read and delete records; both PHRs allow
compatible devices to upload PHI directly to the Patient’s
record via wireless connections to the Internet. Patients are
allowed to share information in their PHRs with external health
service providers, caregivers, coaches, trainers and doctors.
Another common case is the vendor-supplied PHR, in which
an mHealth-device vendor provides an application-specific
record of the data collected by that device, accessible to the
Patient on the vendor’s website. The mHealth-related privacy
issues in such a system are the same as those in the patientcentric PHRs mentioned above. We expect Patients will be
challenged, however, to manage their privacy across multiple
PHRs, and to understand the subtle complexities of their trust
relationships with vendors, wireless carriers, Internet service
providers, and healthcare providers.
Architecture and Terminology: We imagine an infrastructure
in which each Patient carries a mobile node (MN), which may
be their mobile phone or other mobile Internet device (MID),
and a personal collection of sensor nodes (SNs) that can
measure data about their activity (accelerometers, pedometers,
location) or physiology (electrocardiograms, pulse oximeters,
blood-glucose meters, weight scales). These sensors may be
carried by the Patient, worn by the Patient, embedded in
their living space, or implanted in their body. The sensors
communicate with the MN through a wireless body-area
network. The MN is responsible for coordinating the sensors,
collecting the sensor data, (optionally) aggregating or preprocessing the sensor data, and reporting the data to a PHR.
The MN also serves as the Patient’s primary interface to the
PHR, with respect to managing the data-collection process and
subsequent sharing of the data.
The Consumers of these records (including doctors and
other clinical personnel, insurance companies and other
billing-related personnel, researchers and regulators) access
the PHR through some Client computer. The security issues
on this platform are largely out of scope of this paper.
In this paper we focus on the mobile aspects of the infrastructure, and the associated networks to support mobility. Mobility and networking bring many risks: the sensor data may
be intercepted (impacting privacy), tampered with (leading to
incorrect data and care decisions), or blocked (leading to loss
of information to researchers or care providers). Furthermore,
MNs or SNs may be lost or stolen, resulting in possible
exposure of any data or encryption keys they contain. Finally,
since we expect that Patients would like to use their existing
mobile phone as their MN, these risks are compounded
because health-sensing tasks must share the phone with email

and other activities that open the platform to compromise.
Although any viable solution, and any real deployment,
will doubtless be more complex than implied by the above
description, this architecture provides a structural basis and
terminology for our discussion of prior work and upcoming
research challenges, below.
C. Contributions
We make three broad contributions in this paper:
1) we identify a taxonomy of privacy threats in mHealth,
2) we survey prior work and existing technologies, and
3) we identify several important research challenges.
II. T HREAT TAXONOMY
Recalling the NCVHS definition of privacy (in a healthcare
setting) as the user’s right to “control the acquisition, uses, or
disclosures of his or her identifiable health data” [8], a threat
to user privacy is the possibility that his right to control his
PHI is weakened or eliminated due to erroneous or malicious
actions. When these threats are realized, the consequences can
be severe: exposure of identifiable Patient health data leading
to loss of money or reputation, time spent recovering from
medical identity theft, harm to health, or even death.
Table I summarizes these threats, organized by the type of
threat: mis-use of Patient identities, unauthorized access or
modification of PHI, or disclosure of PHI. For each category,
we consider three types of adversary: the Patient himself
or herself, insiders (authorized PHR users, staff of the PHR
organization, or staff of other mHealth support systems), and
outsiders (third parties who act without authorization).
In the following subsections, we survey existing technological approaches to mitigate these and related threats. Although
this survey cannot be comprehensive, due to the limited
length of this paper, we draw on the literature in healthcare
information technology, mobile computing, pervasive computing, wireless networks, sensor networks, cryptography, and
computer security.
A. Identity threats
In the first section of Table I we explore threats related
to Patient identity. There are three concerns here. First, the
Patient may lose (or share) their identity credentials, enabling
others to have access to their PHI in the PHR (or in their MN).
Second, insiders may use Patient identities for medical fraud,
for example, by submitting fraudulent insurance claims [12];
the result can be financially or even medically damaging to the
Patient. Furthermore, in the growing problem of medical identity theft, outsiders (or insiders) may use a Patient’s identity
to obtain medical services [13], potentially with financial or
medical damage to the Patient. Finally, in some settings (such
as research) Patient identities are removed from the PHI, and
the risk is that an outsider may combine the de-identified data
with data from another source to re-identify the Patients, that
is, to re-link Patient identity to their PHI [14].
The most relevant work addresses authentication,
anonymization and re-identification.

TABLE I
P RIVACY- RELATED THREATS IN M H EALTH SYSTEMS
Identity threats: mis-use of patient identities
patients leave PHR credentials on public computer (identity loss)
patients share passwords with outsiders (identity sharing)
patients reveal passwords to outsiders (social-engineering attack)
insiders mis-use identities to obtain reimbursement (insurance fraud) [12]
insiders mis-use identities to obtain medical services (identity theft) [13]
outsiders mis-use identities to obtain medical services (identity theft) [13]
outsiders re-identifying PHI in de-identified data sets [14]
outsiders observe patient identity or location from communications
Access threats: unauthorized access to PHI or PHR
patients consent preferences, as expressed, do not match those desired
patients intentional (or unintentional) access beyond authorized limit
patients mistaken modifications, because of over-privilege or inadequate
controls
insiders mistaken modifications, because of over-privilege or inadequate
controls [15]
insiders intentional unauthorized access, for curiosity or malice [15], [16]
insiders intentional modifications, to obtain reimbursement (insurance
fraud) [12]
outsiders intentional unauthorized access, for curiosity or malice [17]
outsiders intentional modifications, for fraud or malice [17]
Disclosure threats: unauthorized disclosure of PII and PHI
data at rest, in the PHR:
patients inadvertent disclosure due to malware or file-sharing tools [13]
insiders inadvertent disclosure due to malware or file-sharing tools [13]
insiders inadvertent disclosure due to sharing passwords [15]
insiders intentional disclosure, for profit or malice [16]
outsiders intentional disclosure, for profit or malice [16]
data at rest, in the mobile devices:
patients loss of MN or SN exposes PHI, keys, SN types, sensing tasks
outsiders theft of MN or SN exposes PHI, keys, SN types, sensing tasks
data in transit:
outsiders eavesdrop on SN-MN, MN-PHR, PHR-PHR, PHR-client; traffic
analysis and/or content decryption [18, for example]
outsiders observe presence and type of sensors on patient [19]

1) Authentication: Authentication protocols and mechanisms are used to authenticate the Patient (to ensure that the
correct Patient is being sensed), to authenticate the provider
(to ensure that only authorized personnel have access to the
medical equipment or sensor data), and to authenticate devices
(to ensure that only valid sensing equipment can participate,
and that data is sent to the authentic information systems).
Authenticating the Patient. The most common method of
authenticating Patients to a PHR or other healthcare IT system
is to verify a combination of their username and password. Of
course, this method is susceptible to a variety of well-known
attacks. Some PHR providers are testing or deploying twofactor authentication [20].
In mHealth applications there are additional challenges. The
data consumers need to be sure that the data collected by
sensors is collected from the correct Patient; otherwise the
data may be interpreted incorrectly and result in treatment
errors or incorrect conclusions in research or public-health
monitoring [21]. It may be possible to use biometric data for
authentication, or more correctly, for identity verification [22,
for example]. Several research studies propose methods based
on features from electrocardiography (or similar biometrics)
to verify Patient identity [23]. It remains an open problem to
find a robust biometric that is usable, inexpensive, and reliable

under a range of Patient activities.
Authenticating the provider. HIPAA states that covered
entities must “implement procedures to verify that a person or
entity seeking access to electronic protected health information
is the one claimed” [24], and the 2009 HITECH Act extends
this rule to business associates [25]. Most of the issues here are
the same as for authenticating Patient access, above. The US
Department of Veterans affairs has implemented “single signon” authentication to enable users to easily access multiple
portals of the department using only one set of government
issued credentials.
The National Health Service (NHS), in the UK, is one of
the largest national-scale EHR projects underway anywhere.
The NHS Care Records Service (CRS) is a secure service
that links patient information from different parts of the NHS,
enabling authorized NHS staff and patients to have access
to health information [26]. A registration authority within
each healthcare organization is responsible for verifying the
identities of healthcare professionals and support staff, and to
register all caregivers allowed to access CRS. The registration
authority issues a smart card to each caregiver; the smart card
is printed with the user’s name, photo and a unique identity
number. The system uses these cards and identities to provide
role-based access to patient information. However, there have
been reports of “inappropriate access” by sharing of passwords
and PINs by the staff, which poses a serious insider risk [27].
Authenticating devices. Consider our reference architecture. When a mobile node (MN) communicates with sensor
nodes (SNs), it must determine whether they are authentic
sensors, that is, they are valid (truly the sensors they claim
to be), untampered (not compromised by an adversary), and
correct (they are the specific instances attached to the desired
Patient, not another Patient nearby). Similarly, the SNs must
determine whether the MN requesting data is the correct MN,
that is, the one authorized to receive sensor data. Finally, MNs
provide reports to, or obtain configuration from, healthcare
services; these transactions also require mutual authentication
so that the service believes the data comes from the correct
MN (really, the correct Patient), and the MN believes the
data is sent to (or configuration comes from) an authorized
healthcare service.
Fundamentally, these authentication challenges may be easily solved by asymmetric cryptography and a public-key
infrastructure. The problem is not so simple, however, for
five reasons. First, these mobile devices are necessarily small
and their resources are limited; asymmetric cryptography is
computationally expensive. Second, these devices are often
disconnected from the Internet, or have a weak connection to
the Internet, obviating solutions that assume a live connection
to (for example) a certificate authority. Third, these devices
are small and may be easily lost or stolen, leading to a loss or
exposure of embedded keys. Fourth, key distribution and key
storage require secure and easy-to-use solutions, and yet some
nodes have little or no human interface. Finally, some of the
devices (notably the MN) may be owned and configured by
the Patient rather than by the medical device manufacturer or

healthcare provider.
We have seen few solutions in the literature that attempt to
address the broad key-management challenge in the context of
mHealth. One approach considers mote-class sensor nodes and
demonstrates techniques for secure key exchange, biometric
methods to authenticate the Patient, and an encryption protocol
to protect the sensor data [28]. Others have demonstrated that
it is feasible and inexpensive to couple mote-class sensor nodes
with hardware-encryption support like that in a TPM [29].
Finally, since mobile devices like the MN and SN can
be easily lost or stolen, secure key storage is an important
challenge lest the keys become available to an adversary.
2) Anonymity: The HIPAA Privacy Rule states that covered
entities may use or disclose PHI that is de-identified without
restriction [30]. Covered entities that seek to release such PHI
must determine that the information has been de-identified
using either statistical methods to verify de-identification or
by removing certain parts of the PHI as specified in the
Rule. Under the Rule, a covered entity can de-identify PHI
by removing all 18 elements that could be used to identify
the Patient or the Patient’s relatives, employers, or household
members. The Rule also requires the covered entity to have
no actual knowledge that the remaining information could be
used alone or in combination with other information to identify
the Patient. The HITECH Privacy Rule does not add anything
new to this section of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
B. Access threats
In the next section of Table I we explore threats related to
unauthorized access to PHI, whether in the MN or the PHR.
The first threat comes from the Patient himself or herself,
because (under the definition of health information privacy) the
Patient has a right to control the collection, use, and disclosure
of PHI; if the Patient fails to express their consent consistent
with their actual preference, for whatever reason, they may
allow broader-than-intended collection, access or disclosure.
Insiders may “peek” at Patient data, out of curiosity, or with
the intent to harm the Patient (e.g., an employer who snoops on
employer-provided PHR and fires workers with expensive conditions) [15], [16]. Outsiders may break into Patient records,
which may lead to embarrassment (e.g., exposing a Patient’s
psychiatric data to his divorced spouse) [17].
Several of these threats involve the modification of health
records. In a PHR, Patients (or insiders [15]) may mistakenly
modify their data if the access-control policies are too permissive, or if the mechanisms too easily allow mistakes. Insiders
may modify PHI intentionally, to obtain reimbursement via
insurance fraud [12]. Outsiders may also modify a Patient’s
PHI, for fraud or malice [17].
In this subsection we survey work on consent management
(allowing the Patient to determine what access is permitted),
access control (policies and mechanisms), auditing (to support
detection of violations), and data integrity.
1) Consent Management: A common legal requirement
is that PHR service or healthcare providers obtain consent
from a Patient before disseminating her medical records to

other providers or to entities such as a marketing department,
medical researchers, or public-health officials. Presenting the
privacy policy in an understandable format – such that the Patient can set her preferences to provide or withhold consent –
is a major challenge. Bellman et al. describe risks to Patient
privacy due to the manner in which “opt-in” or “opt-out”
questions are posed on a consent form [31]. The Healthcare IT
Standards Panel (HITSP), a public-private partnership between
US governments (federal and state) and health-related organizations, has released an interoperability standard specifying the
management of machine-interpretable “consent directives” that
Patients may issue to healthcare organizations on the access,
collection, use and disclosure of their data [32].
2) Access Control: A mechanism for controlled access to a
Patient’s PHI, which restricts access to only legitimate entities,
is necessary to ensure Patient privacy. Standards bodies in the
US, such as HL7 Standards Development Organization, have
chosen the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model [33] to
enforce access control in traditional healthcare IT systems.
Although RBAC is not “privacy-aware” (access is either
granted or denied), Ni et al. discuss how to extend standard
RBAC to make it “privacy-aware” and enforce authorizations
at a finer level of granularity [34]. The RBAC model fits well
in an organized healthcare setting, such as a hospital, because
each entity in a hospital has a specific role and follows a welldefined hierarchy. On the other hand, identifying roles and
managing role membership is difficult in large organizations.
And, certain features, such as “break-the-glass” to override
access control rules in medical emergencies, do not exist in
traditional RBAC [35].
3) Auditing: Both HIPAA [24] and HITECH [25] require
users within the healthcare provider’s organization to be held
accountable for their actions when handling Patients’ protected
health information. There are different approaches to maintaining audit controls for such information; one approach [36]
specifies a profile for the Audit Trail that contains sufficient
information to answer questions such as: “For some user:
which Patient’s PHI was accessed? For some Patient PHI:
which users accessed it? What user authentication failures
were reported?” Such approaches help detect unauthorized
access, illegal disclosure of PHI, and attempts by hackers to
break into a PHR system.
4) Data integrity: HIPAA [24] states that covered entities
must “implement policies and procedures to protect electronic
PHI from improper alteration or destruction”. In an mHealth
setting, the Patient’s MN is responsible for confidentiality and
integrity of the data, at least within the body-area network;
typical solutions include encryption or a cryptographicallysecure hash. Again, because key management is fundamental
to achieving data confidentiality, there is a need to investigate
mechanisms for key management in mobile environments.
C. Disclosure threats
In the final section of Table I we explore threats related to
the disclosure of PHI, including data at rest and data in transit.

We now survey work related to secure data transmission,
device presence, and device compromise and theft.
1) Secure Transmission: Although both HIPAA [24] and
HITECH [25] require secure communication between HIPAAcovered entities, our concern here is an adversary who wishes
to obtain confidential medical information from observing
the network communications between the MN and its SNs,
or between the MN and the distant health services. In the
mHealth setting, we must assume the use of wireless networks
and open standards. There are four fundamental challenges.
First, the adversary may inspect the wireless-network packets and obtain sensitive medical data; this problem can be
resolved by encrypting all communications with a secure
encryption method and an appropriately strong encryption
key. Most emerging services use HTTP over SSL, but we
know of one approach leveraging SIM-card support in mobile
phones [37]. Key management remains a challenge, however.
Second, even if the wireless-network traffic is encrypted,
in some settings it is possible for a clever adversary to use
traffic analysis to determine characteristics of the traffic [38].
It may be possible, for example, to determine the type of
sensor node from the pattern of its communications, or the
type of medical application by observing the pattern of MN
communications [18].
Third, the adversary may use physical-layer or link-layer
fingerprinting methods to identify the device type. In general, fingerprinting techniques observe subtle differences in
the network behavior of devices, because of implementation
differences across manufacturers, models, revisions, or even
individual devices [39, for example].
Fourth, because the wireless medium is open, an active
adversary may inject frames or may selectively interfere with
(cause collisions with) wireless frames. These methods may
enable the adversary to create a man-in-the-middle situation,
to use link-layer fingerprinting methods, or to compromise the
devices in a way that divulges their secrets. Indeed, there are
increasing concerns (and demonstrated attacks) regarding the
wireless communications of implanted medical devices [19].
2) Device presence: A Patient may consider the fact that
they are using personal medical sensors to be private information; a Patient may not want an employer to know, for example,
that she is wearing a fetal monitor. The challenge, then, is to
allow MN-SN communication, without exposing to an eavesdropper the fact that they are medical devices, nor to allow
the adversary to track the Patient’s location via recognizable
device identifiers. We are unaware of any research specific
to the mHealth context. Most of the relevant work relates to
network-identifier privacy [40, for example, about Wi-Fi]. It
remains to be seen whether there is a standards-compliant
solution in which the link-layer identifiers (and other fields
related to link-layer discovery) can be constructed to not leak
information about sensor type.
3) Device compromise, theft: The Patient’s MN may be
compromised, for example, by an email-borne virus. The MN
or SN devices may be lost or stolen. In any case there are
several risks. The adversary may obtain access to personal

health information, or learn the type of sensor nodes, both
of which may expose information about the Patient’s medical
condition. Moreover, any key material may be obtained by the
adversary, potentially allowing the adversary to decrypt previous, current, or future communications between the Patient’s
MN and SNs, or between the MN and the PHR. Furthermore,
the key material may enable the adversary to inject false data
into the MN or health records system, or even to reconfigure
the Patient’s other devices. Finally, the key material may
enable the adversary to decrypt data stored in the PHR. The
specific risks depend on the protocols used for data transfer,
on the encryption methods used, and on the security of key
generation, distribution, revocation, and storage. We have not
seen any complete solution to this problem in the literature.
A possibly more insidious threat is the unintended disclosure of sensor data by applications installed by the user,
including applications unrelated to healthcare. The security
community is just beginning to address this threat [41].
III. S UMMARY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
We believe it is essential to consider privacy in the design and implementation of any mHealth system, given the
sensitivity of the data collected. In this paper we outline a
threat taxonomy for mHealth privacy, and we discuss some
the technologies that could support privacy-sensitive mHealth
systems. Because of page limitations, our survey is necessarily
not comprehensive.
Much research remains; consider, for example, the following
questions. How can the Patient use their MN to easily manage
consent, i.e., express preferences over collection, dissemination and retention of PHI, and make consent decisions
when requests occur? How should MN hardware and software
architecture change to help protect Patient privacy and enable
them to manage privacy? What technology would help to
enforce control over PHI? What solutions provide reliable
Patient identity verification and preserve Patient privacy in
the process? What are effective algorithms to anonymize
PII before disclosing it to another party, e.g., for research
or for a medical opinion? What mechanisms can be used
to support accountability and non-repudiation? What support
services does an mHealth system need? Consider policymakers, certification bodies, manufacturers, remote management,
and a key-management infrastructure. Finally, how does one
address the inevitable trade-offs (e.g., between anonymity and
accountability, or Patient authenticity and privacy)?
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